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Former U.S. Commerce Secretary and Kellogg CEO Carlos Gutierrez
Joining Albright Stonebridge Group as Vice Chairman

Washington, D.C. — Albright Stonebridge Group (ASG), the leading commercial diplomacy and strategic advisory firm, announced today that former U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez has joined as a Vice Chairman, bringing unparalleled international trade and investment expertise and management talents to the firm. Secretary Gutierrez joins ASG from Citi where he served as Vice Chairman of the Institutional Clients Group and a member of the Senior Strategic Advisory Group.

“What makes the Albright Stonebridge team so effective is our deep understanding of the different languages of business, government and civil society – and of diverse countries and cultures,” said Madeleine K. Albright, Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group. ”Carlos not only understands this intersection, but he has had a remarkable career successfully leading major public and private sector entities. His expertise and global business insights will add enormous value to the work we do for our clients in every corner of the globe.”

“Carlos is a seasoned leader who has been engaged at the highest levels in some of the most significant commercial, diplomatic, and policy decision-making over the last decade,” said Samuel R. Berger, Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group. “Carlos combines the finest qualities of a corporate and political statesman. His insights, international expertise, and integrity will serve our clients worldwide.”

Secretary Gutierrez said, “I am delighted to join ASG’s leading international commercial diplomacy practice during an exciting time in its global growth. I have admired the firm and its leadership for some time and I am enthusiastic to combine my global experience in the commercial and policy arenas to help ASG in its full range of local and geographic expertise and unparalleled client service.”

Born in Havana, Cuba, Mr. Gutierrez served as U.S. Secretary of Commerce from 2005 to 2009 under President George W. Bush. He joined the Bush administration after spending nearly 30 years with Kellogg Company, starting as a sales representative in Mexico City and rising to President and Chief Executive Officer in 1999, becoming the youngest CEO in the company’s 100-year history. In April 2000, he was named Chairman of the Board of Kellogg Company. Mr. Gutierrez’s tenure as Chairman and CEO led to sustained growth at the company and value creation.

As the 35th Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Secretary Gutierrez was responsible for heading a Cabinet agency with almost 40,000 employees and a $6.5 billion budget focused on promoting American business at home and abroad. During his tenure as Secretary, he worked with foreign government and business leaders to advance economic relationships, enhance trade, and promote U.S. exports. Secretary Gutierrez also played a key role in the passage of landmark free trade agreements that strip away trade barriers, expand export opportunities and boost global investment.

Mr. Gutierrez recently became chairman of Republicans for Immigration Reform, the political action group that he co-founded late last year. He also serves as a National Trustee at the University of Miami, a visiting scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies at the University of Miami. He is a trustee on the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, on the Board of Trustees of Meridian International Center, and a Member of the Board of the U.S.-Mexico Foundation.

About Albright Stonebridge Group

Albright Stonebridge Group (ASG) is a leading commercial diplomacy and strategic advisory firm chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger that has helped clients navigate the intersections of business, the public sector, and civil society in over 100 countries on six continents. The firm is headquartered in Washington, D.C., with more than 100 seasoned professionals around the world. ASG works with chief executives and their corporations, businesses, associations, foundations, and non-profits to assess and manage risk, realize opportunities, position themselves for success, and solve commercial, political, and regulatory challenges. The firm’s global network includes team members in Bangkok, Beijing, Berlin, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Kampala, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Stockholm, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Santiago de Chile, Shanghai, Sydney, and elsewhere.

For more information visit: www.albrightstonebridge.com

This week, when Air Force One lands in Tel Aviv, the newly reelected American president and the Israeli prime minister with a new government will turn the page on a new chapter in their relationship. And they will discuss how to manage the strategic challenges we both face in ways that protect our respective interests.

Much has been made and said about the personal relationship between Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu. Some of it is even true: It has been far from tension-free, and is very much in need of a reboot. But I also think that too much has been said about it, as if the bilateral relationship could be reduced to their personal rapport — as if the strategic dimension of the two countries’ ties were either anecdotal or purely a function of personal chemistry.

We should leave aside some of that background noise and focus more on where the strategic relationship stands today, what challenges it faces, and how this visit can help overcome them.

First, it has been said before but bears repeating, for it is neither propaganda nor spin: Military and security cooperation between the two countries has never been stronger. That is a fact confirmed by both sides and witnessed in countless ways: intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, extraordinarily close consultation on questions like Iran and, of course, joint efforts on the Iron Dome anti-rocket system. That is far more important than whether the two leaders can be best friends.

Second, it is true that in some respects the two countries experience events in the Middle East somewhat differently. When Israelis look out their windows, virtually in any direction, what they see is far greater uncertainty, volatility, and even peril than ever before.

And so, it is only natural that, when the United States invests in negotiations with Iran, engages with the Muslim Brotherhood, supports democratic transitions, and urges progress in the peace process, some Israelis suspect it of misunderstanding the region or, worse, of naiveté. Yet my sense is that the president is anything but naïve. True, Israel lives in the region and we do not, and differences in outlook and different threat perceptions are inevitable byproducts of our respective locations.

But that doesn’t necessarily translate into divergent strategic pursuits, nor should it. And a principal goal of this trip is to clarify that point. Take the issues one by one:

First, Iran. Both Obama and Netanyahu have made clear that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and that they will act — militarily if necessary — to prevent it. Both men mean what they say. The task at hand is to manage the nuances in their approach in a way that protects their countries’ respective interests.

The United States is convinced that the door for diplomacy has not yet closed. That is partly because, as Obama said again last week, he believes Iran is at least a year away from being able to acquire a bomb, and partly because the sanctions are taking a tremendous toll, which he believes might affect the Iranian leadership’s strategic calculus. Chances are uncertain, but at the very least the administration believes the United States should allow the Islamic Republic to reflect on its economic predicament before closing the door on a negotiated settlement. The administration also believes that by going the extra mile diplomatically, it will be in a far better position to forge an international coalition for whatever is required should diplomacy fail. This is not naiveté. It is prudent statecraft.

And so, while Israel might be skeptical about the prospects for diplomacy, Netanyahu needs to give the president the time and space necessary to play this out. And Obama’s challenge is to persuade the prime minister that the United States will act in a timely manner to ensure that Iran will not acquire a bomb. Granted, this is no easy thing for any leader in Israel — a country that has learned not to rely on others for their survival. But it is essential given the considerable stakes.

Second, the issue of the Arab transition, notably Egypt and Syria. That things look gloomy and ominous from the Israelis’ perspective is only natural, and who can blame them? The question is what to do about it. And the question is whether U.S. and Israeli interests are better served by keeping the Islamists at a distance or by engaging them.

As far as I can see, there are no real substantive differences between Israel’s and America’s interests in this regard. Take the case of Egypt: Both countries want the Camp David accords to survive and the Sinai to be stabilized, its jihadist elements curbed and arms trafficking halted. Each wants Cairo to take steps to shut down the tunnels leading into Gaza; wants Egypt’s political leadership to engage more openly with its Israeli counterpart; and wants to avoid a collapse of the Egyptian economy that could have dangerous spillover effects while radicalizing its politics.

All of these interests are more easily pursued by engaging the elected Egyptian leadership — albeit critically — than by snubbing it. Regardless of what some Israelis might say publicly, they too recognize this: Last year, when war erupted between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, U.S. mediation with Cairo was instrumental in restoring calm; when security frays in Sinai, Israel urges the United States to press Egypt to crack down on terrorist cells; and Israel wants Obama to keep pressing President Mohammed Morsy’s government to engage directly with its Israeli counterparts.

Of course the United States does not see eye to eye with Cairo on a whole range of issues. Obama should be clear about the principles he believes are essential in its domestic struggles – pluralism, inclusiveness, tolerance, rule of law. But America’s policy of dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood is one on which the United States and Israel can agree.

The same principle holds in Syria. Both Obama and Netanyahu are being pulled into the vortex of the Syrian crisis more than they would like. After extracting the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan, the president is hardly eager to become entangled in another Middle East conflict — one with uncertain players on the ground, swirling sectarian cross-currents, and no clear-cut exit strategy. As it watches jihadi groups gain a foothold not just in Syria, but in the Golan itself, Israel too is hardly sanguine about the country’s future after President Bashar al-Assad.

But neither country can escape the consequences of Syria’s unraveling. More than a million refugees now pose a threat to the stability of Syria’s neighbors, including Jordan and Lebanon, a prospect that spells more trouble for the region, the United States and Israel. Sectarian clashes in Syria are deepening sectarian battle lines in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. Islamic jihadists — some of the best equipped and most capable fighters in Syria — are establishing a strong position.

Syria’s disintegration could unleash the Assad regime’s stockpile of chemical and other weapons. Hezbollah, with the support of Iran, might shift rockets and other sophisticated weapons from Syria to Lebanon. And after years of a relatively stable border with Syria along the Golan Heights, Israel now faces growing jihadist threats there and a U.N. monitoring mission under pressure.

The United States and Israel thus share the common goal of expediting Assad’s departure in a way that minimizes risks to regional stability and of an imploding Syrian state. In his recent trip to the region, Secretary of State John Kerry — building on the work done by his predecessor Hillary Clinton — opened channels of direct aid (though still non-lethal) to the opposition and lent full public support to the assistance by others. The United States should do more to help shift the balance of forces on the ground — to increase the pressure on Assad before a bloody battle over Damascus. U.S. agencies are gaining greater knowledge about the groups on the ground. The battle today over the ouster of Assad is the prelude to the battle over the future of Syria after Assad goes. The United States can’t expect to have much influence on that future, nor much leverage on those who will decide it, if it is not working to strengthen more moderate groups now.

Finally, the third topic for Obama and Netanyahu is Israeli-Palestinian peace. This arguably is the one most fraught with disagreement: Whereas the United States sees this as an important issue that must be tackled with some urgency, many in Israel see things differently. They believe progress is highly unlikely, that concessions at a time of regional volatility are unwise, and that the world must first take care of Iran.

It is important from the outset to clarify a few points: The argument made by those in the United States on behalf of movement on the peace process is not — nor has it ever been — that resolving the conflict is the key to resolving all other regional issues. No, the argument made by those of us who advocate efforts on behalf of a two-state solution is different: It is that the status quo is not stable and does not serve U.S. interests, Israel’s or those of moderate Palestinians.

In the West Bank, the combination of rising economic distress, anger at the Palestinian Authority — which has problems paying salaries — and loss of faith in negotiations, is combustible. Clashes between Palestinians and Israelis are increasing. Palestinian security cooperation with Israel is fraying, leading to an increase in incursions by the Israeli military. The danger of a misstep quickly escalating out of control is real.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas probably is the last Palestinian leader for some time with the authority and inclination to sign a peace agreement with Israel. What comes after him is uncertain at best; in particular, if Hamas’s narrative of resistance dominates, there will be no prospect for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Israel rightly argues that the regional situation is bleak, and then often evokes this as a reason to be cautious on the Palestinian question. I would turn that around: Yes, the region is volatile. And, yes, there is very little Israel can do to mitigate the risks it faces in Egypt, Syria, and beyond. But there is one place where it can act to mitigate risks and take the initiative, and that is the West Bank. It is the place in the region where it possesses the greatest ability to protect itself, to change dynamics, to ensure that forces of moderation prevail.

Of course, the future of the peace process is far from being exclusively in Israel’s hands. We would need to see far greater risk-taking on Abbas’s part as well: willingness to compromise on core issues, end incitement, and move forward on the path to peace. But Israel, with U.S. military, diplomatic, and political support, can and should do its part to bend the arc of history where it can — which could then have positive repercussions elsewhere.

The president has made clear that he is not carrying a peace plan, nor does he intend to launch a high-profile peace initiative when he is in Israel. That is the right posture for this trip. There is a new Israeli government and the groundwork has not been laid. The last thing that is needed now is a grand gesture that is an instant flop.

Instead, this visit is the beginning of a conversation intended to explain why the United States believes progress is important for Israel. No one benefits from negotiations for negotiations’ sake. But Obama should make the case — publicly and privately, both in Jerusalem and Ramallah — that a two-state solution is the only path to durable peace and security, that time is running out, that all alternatives (a de facto one-state outcome, another Palestinian uprising, the triumph of Hamas’s narrative) are far worse. Obama needs to signal that, if the parties are ready, he and Secretary Kerry are willing and able to invest time and energy into this effort.

Like a pendulum swing, many have gone from exuberant optimism about the region when the so-called Arab Spring first began, to extraordinary gloom and doom. The former was as premature as the latter is unjustified. There is absolutely no doubt that the collapse of state structures, rise of Islamist groups, and chaos present real challenges to U.S. and Israeli security.

But if the Arab uprisings taught us anything, it is that the future is not preordained. The region is writing its own history, and there are limits to how much it can be shaped from the outside. Still, our two countries can and should do what they can to bend it in a direction that best comports with our strategic interests. As Obama and Netanyahu sit together over the next few days, that is what they should be dealing with — together.

Read this article online at Foreign Policy.

View Samuel R. Berger’s full remarks as prepared for delivery, or watch the video here.

MADRID – US President Barack Obama’s announcement that negotiations will begin on a comprehensive “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” has generated excitement on both sides of the Atlantic. After a restless month in which it appeared that momentum for talks had dissipated, the announcement has renewed hope that a transformative agreement between the United States and the European Union can be reached.

Though commentators and policymakers have noted the numerous challenges inherent in such a pact, the general mood is one of optimism, reflected in US Secretary of State John Kerry’s comments in Berlin during his first overseas trip since taking office. But, in order to prevent negotiations from stalling over sensitive topics, such as subsidies and food safety, key political actors should first convene to resolve core differences. If combined with continued senior-level engagement, such an approach could make or break the deal.

The economic benefits of a trade agreement between economies that, together, account for more than 50% of global output and maintain nearly $4 trillion in cross-border investment are evident. Such an agreement could also transform transatlantic ties more broadly.

An ambitious transatlantic trade pact that is fully compatible with World Trade Organization standards and accepting of third parties should aspire to more than laying the groundwork for an “economic NATO.” Indeed, it should seek to create the foundation for a free-trade area of the entire Atlantic basin, with membership extending to Africa and Latin America.

The completion of a US-EU trade agreement would reenergize a transatlantic relationship that has been weighed down by the eurozone crisis and is at risk of becoming strategically irrelevant. Yet, sadly, we have been down this road before, only to run out of pavement.

In the mid-1990’s, as policymakers sought to reframe post-Cold War US-European relations, there was movement toward the establishment of a transatlantic free-trade area (TAFTA). But US fatigue following the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, together with rising domestic protectionism, helped to keep TAFTA on the ground. The most recent push, in 2007, was derailed by policy disagreements, particularly over health and safety standards.

The current environment appears to be more favorable. The economic boost provided from such a partnership is badly needed on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, free trade provides Obama with a potential major policy victory on an issue that should garner bipartisan support. Meanwhile, negotiations offer Europe the opportunity to shift its narrative from the monotonous drone of crisis management to a genuine recipe for growth.

And, of course, there is now the impetus posed by the world’s rising economic powers, which are challenging the ability of the US and Europe to dictate the standards of international trade.

It has been suggested that a good way to start the talks would be to consider the free-trade and free-trade-related agreements that the US and EU already have in place. But the success of the upcoming talks will need more than positive atmospherics and a starting line for technical negotiations. Achieving an agreement also requires political will at the highest levels.

In the US, the president and Congress must both be engaged to ensure that entrenched domestic interests, such as agriculture and civil aviation, do not impede a potential agreement. The truly contentious issues – genetically modified (GM) food, subsidies, and intellectual-property rights – should be raised with the key political actors now, not later. And, including US congressional leaders – particularly House and Senate Republicans who support such a deal – in the talks from the beginning would increase the chances of success, because an agreement would not be seen solely as a victory for the Obama administration.

Moreover, a bipartisan approach might ease authorization for so-called Trade Promotion Authority, allowing the president to present an agreement for an up-or-down vote without possibility of amendment – which will be essential for the completion of negotiations. We have already seen qualified US congressional support from Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and ranking Republican Orrin Hatch who, while calling the potential agreement “an enticing opportunity,” specifically noted the need to address “unwarranted agricultural barriers” in the EU, including policies on GM organisms and hormones.

The EU, for its part, must go beyond the European Commission and directly involve the European Council and heads of member states. Though negotiation of an agreement is within the Commission’s competence, movement on the key issues requires the clear support of member states. Compromise on agricultural issues or geographical indications, for example, will not occur without French and Italian support. Indeed, there have already been grumblings from France about agricultural reform and cultural subsidies.

The final report of the High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, released ahead of Obama’s announcement, recommended that the “EU and the United States meet periodically at senior levels after negotiations have started” to review the progress of the talks. This is an excellent suggestion, but such senior-level engagement should also occur at the outset, before the start of formal trade negotiations, which are expected to begin this summer.

What is needed is a focused high-level meeting that brings together a small number of essential political leaders. Besides the obvious negotiators – EU trade commissioner Karel de Gucht, Commission President José Manuel Barroso, and the new US Trade Representative – this group should include European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, key European heads of state, and senior Obama administration officials. Key US congressional leaders should also be involved.

A working summit would demonstrate a willingness at the highest echelons to resolve in principle the major obstacles standing in the way of an agreement. If successful, such a meeting would lay a foundation of genuine political support for efficient and effective technical negotiations. An agreement that rejuvenates the transatlantic relationship will require nothing less.

Read it online at the Project Syndicate.

MADRID – The start of any year invariably prompts stocktaking, and 2012 certainly offers much to consider: the dramatic events in the Middle East, leadership change in China, and the brinkmanship of America’s budget debate. All were high in importance, if not always in popular interest. That seems especially true of the painful and excruciatingly prolonged – indeed, still ongoing – process of saving the euro.

The euro’s survival in 2012 – if only by the skin of its teeth – confounded skeptics who forecast Greece’s exit from the eurozone and the single currency’s collapse by the end of the summer. Indeed, the European Union’s future still seems acutely uncertain, owing mainly to a mismatch between rhetoric and reality.

In the realm of reality, the latest of many “grand” summits in Brussels has left a yawning gap between Europe and a fiscal union, as heads of state stripped much of the substance from the blueprint proposed by Herman Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, and developed by the European Commission.

Nonetheless, concrete and positive steps toward institutional consolidation – though far from achieving the ambitions of some – have been taken. The creation of the European Stability Mechanism, the European Central Bank’s new supervisory role, and the ECB’s purchases of sovereign bonds over the course of the last year have provided much-needed relief to Europe’s beleaguered peripheral economies. Moreover, Europe is one step closer to a full-fledged banking union.

The main impediment to further progress is that two competing narratives have emerged to explain Europe’s economic travails and lay out a path forward. One centers on the eurozone’s structural flaws and aims at strengthening the institutional framework, whereas the other highlights faulty domestic policies and focuses on austerity. Alarmingly, the resulting political debate has degenerated into a shrill cacophony of moral righteousness, finger-pointing, scapegoating, and stereotyping.

In fact, though often portrayed as irreconcilable opposites, the two approaches to resolving the euro’s problems are complementary – indeed, essential – components of any realistic approach to ensuring the eurozone’s future. Likewise, neither narrative alone can provide a vision for the EU; the gap between them can be filled only by trust.

Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and even France need to control their deficits and streamline debt. But no degree of austerity on its own will enable Europe’s southern economies to get back on their feet.

Consider Greece. Anticipating desertion by Europe and convinced that painful budget cuts and repayment will benefit only its creditors, the country has ring-fenced itself, and has been sapped of all motivation to undertake the reforms dictated by Brussels. Meanwhile, Germans regard economic transfers to the South as a moral-hazard problem that no European political agreement could resolve. Seeing only one side of the equation, public opinion has become polarized between northern and southern Europe, perpetuating a vicious cycle of mistrust.

It would be equally wrong to imagine that institutional changes alone will fix Europe’s problems. While an integrated financial framework for Europe is taking shape, daunting decisions regarding the design of a European resolution mechanism need to be worked out. A banking union will undoubtedly entail significant encroachments on sovereignty (for example, decisions to close banks, distribute losses, or cut workforces at the national level), which, unless accompanied by progress toward a political union, will generate a crisis of legitimacy.

Thus, addressing Europe’s serious economic issues requires wading into the deep waters of the political imagination. So far, however, policies aimed at shoring up the euro have been narrowly technical, in an effort to isolate Europe’s financial travails from popular discontent over its direction. That debate has been left to fester, serving as a dangerously dysfunctional pressure valve for turbulent and frustrated citizens across Europe.

Confronted with the reality of disgruntled electorates, pundits are quick to bemoan the “democratic deficit” of the Union’s institutions. Lately, they have been pleading for the direct election of the European Commission president, the transformation of the Council of Ministers into a form of second legislative chamber, or for the establishment of Europe-wide political parties to contest elections to the European Parliament.

None of these initiatives would work, however, owing to a simple, inconvenient truth: to this day, Europeans view each other in “us versus them” terms. Europe’s common institutions –both old and newly created – can survive in the long run only if a common European identity materializes to underpin them.

The emergence of such an identity depends on politicians’ ability to communicate to their fellow citizens the Union’s real advantages and the bleak prospects of nation-states that try to go it alone. In a “post-European world,” Europe is globally relevant only when united. The single market is the paramount example at one extreme, with defense – plagued by duplication and lacunae between EU countries – at the other.

Although politicians and voters are equally unwilling to admit it, the EU has reached a fork in the road. One route leads to further integration, while the other implies a return to national sovereignty; navigating the former will require great effort, whereas the latter is a relatively straight downward path. Ultimately, the EU’s future – if it has any future at all – depends on constructing a coherent narrative that articulates that choice explicitly.

Read it online at the Project Syndicate.

The recent experience of “reset” in Russian-American relations is remarkable in at least two ways. On the one hand, it demonstrated that, given the political commitment of both presidents, the two sides can accomplish a lot within a short time span. On the other hand, this experience confirmed that the relationship between our countries remains vulnerable to shifting political winds and passing policy differences, as we are currently witnessing.

The challenge we face at the beginning of 2013 is not to preserve reset, but to move beyond it. The time has come to turn the page and to address the realities of the 21st century.

With President Obama re-elected and President Vladimir Putin solidly in charge in Moscow, now is time for both leaders to reinvigorate U.S.-Russian cooperation to the benefit of the two countries. They can also act together to strengthen global security in general and pave the way for a more stable and predictable world.

American and Russian interests converge on a number of significant and timely issues. As we have written together in the past, the two countries share a common objective in reducing the nuclear danger. The New Start Treaty was an important achievement, but more can be done, including accelerating implementation of the reductions required by the treaty (why wait until 2018 to have the limits take full effect?), and launching a new bilateral negotiation to further cut nuclear stockpiles.

Russia and the United States control 90 to 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. We can readily continue negotiations of further reductions and still safely ensure our security. If we do, we will be more persuasive when asking other nuclear-weapons states to join in the nuclear-arms reduction process and will enhance the credibility of our diplomacy in mobilizing international pressure on Iran to refrain from trying to build a nuclear weapon.

Next year will mark the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the first nuclear arms control agreement. It would be an appropriate year for the U.S. Senate to consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has been languishing for 13 years. The United States could then join Russia among the countries that have ratified, thus bringing the treaty closer to entry into force.

The long-running dispute over missile defense continues to cast a shadow over possible progress on arms control, even though both NATO and Russia say they want to cooperate in that sphere. Now is the time to be creative. With some imagination on both sides, missile defense could prove a game-changer, making NATO and Russia allies in protecting Europe.

We have focused on arms control issues not just because of the important security implications for Russia and the United States. Progress on arms control can also help stimulate gains in the broader relationship, as has been demonstrated in the past.

Cooperation between Russia and the United states makes sense on a range of other issues.

For example, neither the United States nor Russia wants Afghanistan to revert to control by the Taliban or become a failed state. That is why Russia has been so helpful in facilitating the flow of supplies to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. As the end of major operations by coalition forces draws near, Washington and Moscow, together with others, should support Afghan leaders in constructing a stable society, able to withstand pressure from violent extremist groups.

Another area of mutual interest is promoting an expansion of U.S.-Russian trade and investment relations. The current level of bilateral commerce falls significantly short of its potential, given the size of the countries’ economies. An increase would benefit both. Russia’s recent entry into the World Trade Organization will help, as will full implementation of the important trade and market access provisions that made that agreement possible. The U.S. Congress decision to remove Cold War restrictions and finally extend permanent normal trade relations status to Russia was long overdue.

Obviously, cooperation on some issues does not mean that Moscow and Washington will see eye-to-eye on every question. Because we interact on so many issues, it is too much to expect agreement in every case. Differences of perspective can sometimes be sharp, as over Syria, human rights and democracy. Nevertheless, disagreements, no matter how complex and painful, must not block the development of ties along other lines. It is essential not to interrupt dialogue even on those issues where positions differ substantially.

The history of relations between Washington and Moscow teaches the importance of presidential engagement and leadership. If our countries are to derive the maximum benefit from our shared interests, Presidents Obama and Putin must make our potential for partnership a priority.

Some speculate that, with Mr. Putin’s return to the Russian presidency, managing U.S.-Russian relations will become more difficult. We see no reason to assume that. The reset improved bilateral ties, which are certainly stronger today than they were in 2008; that progress would not have happened had Mr. Putin opposed it. The challenge for our two presidents is to move now to the next stage — to embark on a historic mission to start a new chapter in bilateral relations between Russia and the United States.

Read it online at the New York Times.

To watch Sandy Berger’s tribute, please click here.

Remarks of Samuel R. Berger as Prepared for Delivery

Memorial Service for Former Senator Warren Rudman

November 29, 2012

Warren didn’t stop being Warren when he left the Senate in 1993.  He brought the same qualities to the private sector – and to the public missions he was frequently called upon to undertake. Unrelenting. Caring. Fairminded. Impatient with phoniness. Sometimes cantankerous. Always honest.

I first worked with Warren in connection with his service as Chairman of President Clinton’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I watched him investigate some incredibly delicate and politically sensitive matters. President Clinton trusted Warren without question to dig to the bottom and give him advice free of any personal agenda or hint of partisanship.

Later, as Co-chairmen of the Commission on National Security with Senator Hart, he examined the state of our homeland defense. He concluded it was terrible. Nine months before 9/11, he recommended the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security. It was not that he had some magic mirror to look around the corner of time; he looked hard at the facts and was not afraid to draw the necessary – if sometimes lonely – conclusions.

Warren always looked hard at the facts. Like any great lawyer, that was his starting point. He was impatient with ideology; with those who knew the answer before knew what they were talking about. He wanted the evidence; then he would draw his conclusions and chart his course. It is an approach that we would all do well to embrace today.

As a lawyer, Warren was a champion of good corporate governance. He became the “go to” person for companies who needed someone of impeccable integrity to get to the bottom of some corporate mess – to figure out what really happened and what need to be done to make it right. He brought the same doggedness to these investigations as he did to his work on Iran-Contra and the Keating Five. And the remarkable thing is that, regardless of how tough his report was, no one ever questioned its validity. His reputation for integrity was so strong that his conclusions were accepted like the holy grail.

Warren collaborated in founding our firm and served on its Board from inception until he joined us as Co-Chair. He was a large presence in our office. When we faced hard decisions, he saw through the fog and got to the heart of the matter. He was a model and mentor to many. He would sometimes wander into the office of a junior person to chat, tell some stories, listen to them, find out what they were doing and give them some advice. One of our younger colleagues commented the other day that “quality time with Senator Rudman sometimes left you breathless.”

Warren dealt with his illness like everything else in his life – with ruthless honesty and unbounded courage. He was not a passive recipient of his care and treatment – he was co-pilot. He started with the facts. He learned everything there was to know about it. He found the best experts. And then he plowed ahead with fierce determination. He checked in with Tony Harrington and me most mornings to give us an update. He had no illusions. But he intended to move forward, not lie down.

Everyone in the firm was proud of him. His presence enhanced us. His wisdom guided us. His integrity inspired us. His memory will always lift us up.

“We are deeply saddened by the loss of our co-Chair Warren Rudman.   Senator Rudman embodied the qualities we value most in our  public servants – impeccable integrity, unparalleled judgment and unshakable fairness.  He was never blinded by partisanship or rancor.   From the battlefields of Korea to the halls of Congress,  Warren served his country,  the people of New Hampshire and Presidents of both parties with courage and skill.   We send our condolences and prayers to Margaret and all his family.”

Madeleine K. Albright, Chair

Samuel R. Berger, Chair

Anthony S. Harrington, President and CEO

The overriding foreign policy challenge for President Obama going forward is to convince a war weary nation that, in today’s world, we cannot secure our peace or our prosperity without leading others in the world who share our interests. In the Middle East alone, the president will need to make key decisions about American engagement over the next six months. Here are three:

• Iran: Will tough international sanctions induce Iran to negotiate substantial curbs on its nuclear program and avoid the prospect of a risky war? It is impossible to know how quickly the Iranians will move forward with their nuclear program; Israelis believe there is a window of eight to 10 months. During this period, Obama must decide whether to put forward a more probative proposal — intrusive international supervision of a strictly limited peaceful nuclear program in exchange for significant sanctions relief. If they reject that proposal, both their intentions and our good faith will be visible to the world.

• Syria: The administration has tried to balance our interest in ousting President Assad with the risks of diving into a black hole. There are good reasons not to entangle ourselves further. Much of the opposition is unknown to us. We would be giving out weapons that one day could be used against us. There is no U.N. or Arab League mandate.

Nonetheless, Obama will need to decide whether to shift the balance, at least by giving the opposition defensive weapons. By hastening the day of Assad’s departure, we may prevent the civil war from engulfing the region — fueling turmoil within Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. With greater purchase on elements of the opposition, we will have a better chance of influencing the direction of post-Assad Syria and marginalizing Islamic radicals. And we may be able to end the daily slaughter.

• Middle East Peace Process: There are a dozen reasons why the President should not try to restart negotiations. There is no trust between the parties. The Palestinians are divided. The Israelis are surrounded by risk and should not be expected to take more.

Nonetheless, President Obama will need to decide whether he can afford to “kick the can down the road.” Unrest in the Palestinian territories is sure to grow; the Palestinians are not immune to the “Arab Spring.” What comes after President Abbas is almost certain to be worse. The “two-state solution” — on life support today — cannot survive another four years. And a confrontation with Iran will be far more difficult if Iran can wave the Palestinian flag at our Arab allies.

One way or another, the president will deal with the Israeli-Palestinian issue in his second term. Better to deal with it in the context of a peace process rather than conflict resolution.

Read it online at the New York Times.

Energy and climate change, two issues that deeply divide the country, stand out as major pieces of unfinished business for the Obama administration.

Sadly, it is not clear how many disasters it will take and how many billions we will have to spend before we take the potential consequences of climate change seriously. But as the president has said, even for those who don’t believe climate change is real, the benefits of clean energy — cleaner air, energy independence, American jobs and enhanced global competitiveness — are just too important to ignore.

The good news is the president can continue to make real progress toward a clean energy future by using his executive authority and leveraging existing energy laws.

In his first term, Obama, using an energy bill signed by George W. Bush, worked with governors, car industry executives, labor and environmentalists, to reach an agreement on cleaner, more fuel efficient cars. Manufacturers got the business certainty and regulatory flexibility they needed, consumers won savings at the pump and the air we all breathe got a little cleaner.

The Clean Air Act of 1990 mandated technology based standards to reduce dangerous emissions of air toxics. Under that authority, the president has already set limits on mercury pollution that will save 11,000 lives and prevent 130,000 asthma attacks annually while spurring clean energy innovation that will modernize and streamline outdated and inefficient power plants.

The Supreme Court has unanimously affirmed the E.P.A.’s authority to limit greenhouse gases that endanger public health. As he did with the car companies, the president should use the existing authority to work with the electric utilities and power plants to craft a sector plan to reduce carbon pollution and secure greater energy efficiency while providing business certainty.

Finally, ensuring that natural gas is an important part of our energy plan may even provide an opportunity for some old-fashioned bipartisanship. Natural gas is abundant and available here at home. But we need to make sure “fracking” is done in accordance with strong public health standards that protect our resources and provide uniform certainty.

Right now states are responsible for overseeing fracking. That means there could be 20 to 30 different state regulations imposed on fracking businesses. Why not develop one set of national requirements based on the best available science and technology and leave the oversight and enforcement up to the states? Pollution doesn’t recognize state boundaries — a weak requirement in one state could have an impact on drinking water in another. This model has been the basis of the federal-state partnership that has had great success in protecting public health and the environment and has enjoyed Congressional support in the past.

Read it online at the New York Times.

MADRID – In both Catalonia and Scotland, calls for independence are growing once again – an indication of conditions not only in Spain and the United Kingdom, but in the European Union as a whole. Indeed, the EU’s weakness in confronting its financial crisis both reflects and reinforces the erosion of its raison d’être – political integration. Whatever its roots in old grievances, secessionism, it seems, is a painful symptom of this degenerative process.

The perverse irony here is that Europe’s shrewdest secession-minded parties are dressing up their programs in European garb, promising that the new states will have automatic EU membership. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and Convergència i Unió (CiU) in Catalonia are both exploiting the concept of European cosmopolitanism to revive narrow nationalist ends and, ultimately, to break up the countries of which they are now a part.

No provisions of EU law address the disintegration of a member state, as secession contradicts the core principle of “ever closer Union.” That is why there are increasing calls to send a message to electorates in would-be secessionist regions that EU membership would not be guaranteed in the event of independence. Alex Salmond, Scotland’s first minister and the SNP’s leader, proclaimed that the guarantee of EU membership was a matter of law; because it is not, he and his party now face their biggest crisis since coming to power in 2007.

This legal void explains why, in the run-up to Catalonia’s elections on November 25, the CiU’s leaders are so eager to convert an informal referendum on independence into a plebiscite on Catalans’ desire for EU membership (which is neither at issue nor up to the electorate in Catalonia to decide). Rationally, if not legally, the only coherent question that the CiU government could pose is whether Catalans wish to be part of Spain.

The United Nations framework governing secession establishes a clear distinction between “internal self-determination” and “external self-determination.” The former sanctions a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing state; the latter could potentially take the form of unilateral secession, but only under an extreme set of circumstances. Neither definition applies in the case of Catalonia or Scotland.

No one in Catalonia or Scotland can legitimately claim the suppression of cultural identity, which enjoys strong protection in Spain – where one of the main goals of the Spanish Constitution, after Francisco Franco’s death, was to protect the Catalan and Basque languages and cultures – and the UK. Perhaps this helps to explain why the formalScottish claim to independence does not rest on a distinct heritage, but on the shaky notion of distinct political and social values – an argument so vague that it could be used to justify dismantling every European country.

As is often the case with nationalism – irrespective of its dress – the emotional discourse that surrounds calls for independence is merely a mask for naked political ambition and economic self-interest. In Catalonia, victimization has become a campaign strategy, with CiU leaders openly citing imaginary threats from the central government in Madrid, including “Spanish” tanks and “hostile” airplanes above “Catalan airspace.”

Rhetoric aside, the looming Catalan referendum emerged as a result of the political bargaining surrounding bailout discussions between Spain’s regions and the central government. The crisis has stoked demands for independence by adding fervor to many Catalans’ anger at financial transfers to Spain’s poorer regions through the much-maligned Territorial Solidarity Fund.

The question of independence has turned into a powerful bargaining tool vis-à-vis the central government. It also conveniently sweeps existing problems under the rug – for example, Catalan debt makes up close to 30% of the total debt of Spain’s regions – and deflects attention from the CiU regional government’s poor economic management.

Conditions could become much worse with independence. Conservative estimates suggest that exiting from Spain, the euro, and the EU would cause a 20-25% drop in Catalonia’s GDP, as 68% of Catalonia’s international exports go to the EU (according to official 2010 data) and 50% of its total output goes to the rest of Spain.

A similar pattern holds true for Scotland. Moreover, in the wake of the euro crisis, SNP leaders have dropped their old plan to embrace the euro and now say that they will keep the pound.

But criticizing the opportunists who are stoking the fires of secession in Barcelona and Edinburgh is not enough. A demonstration in Barcelona in September that brought close to 8% of Catalonia’s 7.5 million people onto the street showed that there are real issues to be addressed, both at the European and national level.

The core principle of democracy is the ability of citizens to guide the direction of public policy. But today, across Europe, citizens feel impotent. With the economic crisis, this phenomenon is particularly pronounced in Europe’s south, where voters sense uneasily that they have little influence in Berlin, where the real decisions are being made.

In Catalonia, CiU has channeled this frustration into a rejection of Spain’s central government. In Scotland, the austerity policies pursued by David Cameron’s government have provided similar force to the SNP’s independence bid.

Spain was undoubtedly one of the biggest successes of the end of the twentieth century, managing its EU accession and democratic transition while moving from under-development to the eurozone’s fourth-largest economy – and 13th in the world. But the trade-offs that were part of that transition led to consequences – particularly the country’s territorial distribution of power – that must now be confronted openly.

Whatever its cause, unrest in Catalonia should spur a thorough revision of Spain’s 1978 Constitution and the adoption of a true federal structure. If successful, Spanish federalists could then advise others – starting with political leaders in the UK.

Read it online at the Project Syndicate.